What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?
 The new old crisis of the university from a continental perspective.

Achim D. Köddermann
 
State University
of New York, College at Oneonta


Abstract:

   “Orientation” is the new/old task of a free university.  Whereas, the American university follows the tutorial concept of Oxford as paradigm, Continental universities offer alternatives.  Tutorials for the happy few who can afford an excellent education are no solution.  After Humbold’s reforms, European universities were able to overcome the fixed structures of a system of atrophied trade-guild mentality.  However, today universities have to please not just professors and students, but those who provide the financing.  Corporatisation is a threat on the continent,- where universities do not have the financial independence of the American flagship institutions.  So-called "junior professorships," copies from the American system, are incompatible.  In a modern democratic environment, the "Bildungsauftrag" of the university, the educational essence of its mission, is essential for society.  Orientation has no price.  Modern society needs the educational ideal as formulated by Immanuel Kant: "Enlightenment" as escape from media- or "self inflicted tutelage".

    “Was heißt, sich im Denken zu orientiren?” (Kant WDO: 131; Richardson: 87 ”What means, to orient one’s self in thinking?“).  To understand the current global crisis of the university, it is necessary to orient oneself where it all started in the early 12th century: the new old crisis of the university has to include a view from a continental perspective.

    What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?  This was the question Kant answered by pointing to one of the essential functions of higher education; the capacity to help us to orient ourselves in a more and more complex reality.  Before him, Moses Mendelssohn had already pointed out that orientation is necessary for the condition of enlightenment (Mendelsohn).  Orientation allows us to place knowledge, and to find a way to autonomy.

    Kant’s successor at Königsberg addressed the need for orientation in his philosophical dictionary:  “Orientiren (sich) heißt eigentlich den Orient oder den Ort im Horizonte suchen, wo die Sonne zur Zeit der Tag- und Nachtgleiche aufgeht, wodurch dann auch die übrigen Weltgegenden leicht bestimmbar sind” (Krug; Orth: 31).  (“To orient oneself means to find the orient or place on the horizon where the sun rises at the time of the solstice, hence, we can determine the other world regions.”)

    This definition of orientation can be interpreted allegorically.  Knowledge of the place and time allows finding the way.  Applied to universities, it can be said that knowledge as produced by institutions of higher learning allows orientation.  It reaches from the determination of the solstice by ancient civilizations to the more and more refined measurements of time.  Its application, be it through a sun dial, a water clock, or more modern forms of time measurements, is linked to non-applied academic research about the nature of time.  Applications such as the integration of a pendulum in watch making demonstrate that fundamental research can lead to, at first unintended, applications.  It is a necessary precondition for commercial orientation.

    The direct benefit of orientation fell back on society as a whole, not on the providers of knowledge.  In exchange, those in charge of the finding and teaching of knowledge gained academic freedom, respect by society, and autonomy.  Such autonomy, not only for a small elite, but also for society as such, is necessary.  It inspired Humboldt’s attempt to reform the state via a fundamental reform of the university (Natale: 86):  “Der Gang der Wissenschaft ist offenbar auf einer Universität, wo (sie) immerfort in einer großen Menge und zwar kräftiger, rüstiger jugendlicher Köpfe herumgewühlt wird, rascher und lebendiger” (Humboldt: 257).  (“At a university, which constantly rummages through a large number of strong, able bodied youthful heads, the progress of science is faster and more lively.”)

   The problem of the Germanic university is that it has a tendency to rely on old structures, which has led to less innovation and more stasis.  In Germany, this tendency became stronger than in other countries.  Century old institutions kept a reputation that was not tainted by the recent Nazi past (Neuhaus).  Indeed, of the about 85 institutions which have endured for the last 500 years such as the Catholic church, some Swiss cantons, etc., 70 are universities (Kerr, Mathy).  And the “ideal” university, as reformulated by Humboldt, has indeed become the pattern or model for worldwide admiration and imitation.

     Its roots are documented in Fichte’s attempts at a new foundation in the “Wissenschaftslehre” which is seen as an alternative to the purely traditional, repetitive form of learning.  Learning is thereby seen as productive, thus bridging the gap between theory and practice deplored in the rift between universities and universities of applied sciences.  Schelling follows the movement with his “Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums” in 1802: studies are to form an organic whole of knowledge and application.  Friedrich Schleiermacher and H. Steffens (“Über die Idee der Universität,”1809) complete the revised paradigm of the German university (Spranger).  Wilhelm von Humboldt coins its applied form in his drafts for educational reform (Humboldt 1920: 279).  In 1802, Humboldt argued against the old form of specialized training, which he encountered in the French system of higher education:  “Sie ertöteten durch die enge ihres Gesichtskreises jeden wissenschaftlichen Geist und waren schließlich nichts anderes als Schulen der empirischen Praxis” (Spranger: 200 f., “Through the narrowness of its horizon they eliminated all forms of scientific spirit and became nothing else but schools of empirical practice.”)

    Humboldt and his foundation of the free university in Berlin created the model of worldwide university reform.  Jefferson imported the enlightenment inspired Germanic model of higher education to the U. S., and the Ph.D. in its current U. S. form is a copy of the Germanic doctorate (Jefferson).  Early resistance against this Germanic influence came in the U. S. from William James, who deplored “The Ph.D. Octopus” (James) as form of elitism.  In Germany, it became clear in the years after the World War II that century old structures did not provide the right framework.  Lacking the vivid spirit of Humbold’s reforms, the structure of the German post-war university crumbled in the student riots of 1968.  A trendy prediction of a “catastrophe of education,” made by a religious philosopher in 1964, finally became true (Rüthers: 16).  Rioting students addressed the antiquated structures symbolized by old forms “Unter den Talaren der Muff von 1000 Jahren” (Under academic gowns the musty air of 1000 years).  Protesting students were joined by (American-trained emigrant returnees) Adorno and Habermas (Hammerstein).  The authorities responded to the public demand for innovation by a loosening of the old, hierarchical structure; the new mass university, with its anonymity and a lack of belief in itself was born.  Access to higher education by all became the goal of higher education, and its structure was revised, professors had to share power with students and assistants (“Mittelbau”).  For this purpose, the preparatory high school system (Abitur in Germany, Matura in Austria, Baccalaureat in France) was opened to more and more students, allowing wider access to universities than ever before.  The apparent problems of the old, elitist higher education system (Köddermann) were addressed by the invention of a new, parallel track of university-like education, the universities of applied sciences: “Fachhochschulen.”

    There is a fundamental difference between the old idea of the university as institution of higher learning and its counterpart, the university of applied sciences.  In the Austro-Germanic educational system, this difference is clearly formulated as a different approach to praxis and research (Mische: 16 f.).  The intended outcome of the revised mission statements for universities and universities of applied sciences was to allow for competition among universities, both within each category and between university systems.  “Gleichwertigkeit,” equivalence, was the goal formulated by a large political majority.  The intended short-term outcome was to regulate the competition in such a way that a specific flaw of the Germanic university, the long duration of studies, could be addressed.  The university of applied sciences was supposed to compete with the purely theoretical knowledge of long standing, offered by the traditional universities.  The focus on organized, well-structured studies with an intended outcome allowed these to shorten while still allowing applied universities to remain within the realm of science. (The untranslatable Germanic word used in this context is “Wissenschaftlichkeit” which applies to the natural and the “humanistic” sciences, the humanities, alike.)

    Universal comparisons are necessary to ensure the compatibility of knowledge.  For this purpose, the originally absolute independence of the university (see the title, “Freie Univerität” in Berlin) was sacrificed.  Parallel to the development of the U. S. educational system, the quantification of results in a uniform pattern became necessary to allow standardized testing.  The standardization is supposed to allow a comparison of the competing systems, notwithstanding the differences in their original missions.  In 2001, the so-called “Pisa Study” which compared school systems internationally, led to a spurt of reform in Europe.

    Both forms of universities are supposed to prepare the student for professional life.  Traditional universities focus on the teaching of methods.  For the universities of applied sciences however, the mission is reduced to the application of knowledge; thus, professors for the latter category will have to have demonstrated skills beyond the academic realm in at least five years of praxis and to have shown the capacity to transfer academic knowledge to successful application (Mische: 17).

    The traditional condition of tenure at a Germanic traditional university is still the habilitation, a form of second doctorate, which adds an average of five more years to the already lengthy studies of most applicants for continued employment.  Since the goal of applicability gained weight, and when it became obvious that the teaching skills and innovative tendencies of younger faculty could not be developed in the traditionally rigid system, so called “junior professorships” were introduced.  In principle, they will adapt the Germanic system to U. S. standards. The assistant professor is introduced and lifelong tenure in the automatic form of the current university system is replaced by a conditional tenure system. Implemented from “above” by the federal ministry of education, with financial incentives for the complying federal states, it still has many flaws.  For the position called “Junior Professor” tenure track is optional.  It allows a career in the home institution, thus fostering intellectual inbreeding.  It includes some teaching responsibilities as compared to the purely scholarly habilitation (Bulmahn).  In Austria, the attempt to commercialise the university by outcome measurements has led to mass resignations of the self-administered university faculty in 2002.

    The ability to react quickly to the job market, the ability to form alliances, and the internationalisation of their curriculum have shown that in many respects the universities of applied sciences have sharpened their profile to such a degree that they are the clear winners of the competition.  In a way, the European applied universities are following the example of the old English Royal Academy which described its mission under the experimental scientist Robert Hook in 1663 as follows:  “To improve the knowledge of natural things, and all useful Arts, Manufactures, Mechanic Practices, Engines and Inventions by Experiments” (Weld).

    Since nobody will accuse the Royal Society of a lack of scientific rigor and standard, it can be seen that the reforms of the continental university systems are a late adaptation of old structures to new realities, with applicability included in the mission of fundamental research.  Jean Jacques Rousseau addressed the problem in his Second Discourse on the Origins of Inequality Among Men.  The sciences are reproached for not having fostered the benefit of humanity but only that of the privileged few.  However, today’s reforms of the continental university system, with the introduction of bachelor degrees and a separation of graduate and undergraduate studies, are more interested in the applicability of knowledge and the reduction of cost than in the fostering of a link between research and application.  As in all Platonic cases, the Germanic copy is even less desirable than the U. S. original.

    Students of universities of applied sciences are winners and losers of the competition between the university systems.  At first highly employable graduates receive no systematic overview beyond the limits of their original field of studies.  They lack time and space to gain such knowledge.  The structure of their studies is in the hands of others; they remain within a school-like structure.  As tradeoff for the loss of freedom and choice, they gain fast access to the job market.  Their employability is far superior to the average applicant from traditional mass universities.  In principle, their professors stand with both legs in a practical life that prepares the students well.  They spend their time primarily in teaching and not in research; the student being the sole purpose of such institutions, and the application of knowledge dominates all other aspects of academic life.  From a career oriented point of view, one could argue that such focused studies are a full success since even the classical continental universities are unable to offer the alternative: traditional liberal arts degrees as Studium Generale, based since 12th century Salerno, Bologna and Paris on universal knowledge.

    It can be argued that our complex reality needs more broadly spread knowledge, and that the half-life of the claimed applicability is declining: to teach skills successfully does not mean that the student will be able to develop the necessary transfer skills, and the ‘anthropological premise’ of all studies, the view of the whole and the Kantian hope for an exit from self inflicted tutelage, is pushed to the background.  Plato and Aristotle agreed on the necessity to gain knowledge in such a way that we are able to see the “holon” (Wirth: 105), the whole:  In the above quoted text on the need for orientation, Kant claims that abstract, not applied, “Denken” (“Thinking”) is necessary to combine logically.  The freedom to think becomes the last probing stone of truth (Kant WDO: 146; Richardson: 407 “The chief touchstone of truth of one’s self”).

    Since the times of the medieval university, it was not clear whether the whole or the parts are more important, and the quarrel of the Universals is revived today in the competition between universities and universities of applied science.  What is beyond debate is the complexity of systems, which the university of applied science, and more and more, the university as such, have declined the responsibility to address.  Instead, that study has been relegated to specialized fields such as system theory or cybernetics.

    The goal of the university, in its newly revised mission, has to become or remain to understand relationships:  “die Bedingtheit begreifen lernen” (to understand conditionality).  All knowledge is mediated, conditioned by words, concepts, myths (Bösch).  In this sense, we have to address the same problem Aristotle and Plato faced: the belief in easy applications, the “for sale” sign on knowledge, are not new: they have threatened education since sophistry became a trade, not an art.

    However, the trademark university in its privatised, for profit shape as mentioned by Natale is not the true threat for the Germanic or Continental university: here, the “for free” (Joffe) public support for the public institutions of higher learning has so far prevented the success of institutions such as the University of Phoenix (Natale: 39 ff).  However, in anticipation to the same needs as addressed by commercial institutions such as the said University of Phoenix, the European flagship universities have started to engage themselves in a process of self-commercialisation.  Thus, both American and Continental institutions face different symptoms of the same phenomenon.  The sophistication of studies has led to a spread of sophistry...  And those engaged in non-applicable liberal arts education have contributed their own share to the trend: since the appearance of objectivity has been deconstructed.  The appearance of Truth was denounced by those defending it, leading to a general feeling of disorientation.  It is understandable that applicable job skills need no immediate in depth study of theory, and lead to less doubt; therefore, more focus and more immediate happiness than could be achieved through lengthy sophisticated studies of what turned out to be nothing but sophistry: to study ideas without believing in them is not the most promising antidote to the new concept of applied, corporative studies.  The intellectual infighting between different schools of thought has shifted the focus from a university that leads society intellectually to a university that, at best, reports on it, and that cannot agree on the validity of its reports.  In most continental philosophy, for example, the study of past knowledge has become a pure intellectual exercise in glass pearl playing.  No practical results are expected, and the less practical the thesis, the more elaborate the vocabulary, the higher the assumed level of scholarship.  It is understandable that the goal of such studies will not be the understandability of the findings.  It is also understandable that such news will never be shared with a general public (Bauer).  This outdated model of high-priesthood, which confers a form of nobility on the bearers of titles, is partly to be blamed for the current downfall of the classical university.  When universities confer titles to their own governing bodies or to donors, even their intellectual integrity is in question.  Titles loose their respectability, and the conferring universities their role of choice in society.  Respect could then be reduced to the admiration of power and money.  In the field of non-applicable education by public institutions, private commercial enterprises can gain space: the Bank academies in Europe are part of a growing field of parallel educational systems of higher learning.  They introduce corporate knowledge and skill in the curriculum, heightening the applicability.  Such commercial academies are comparable to the educational systems of distant learning as described by Natale for the U. S. (27 f.).  However, in the sense of the original institutions, they are no true universities. 

    Since the commercial success of such institutions and educational systems in the U. S. seems apparent, and since the Continental systems are prone to imitate any U. S. development in order to stop the apparent “brain drain” and educational advantages of the U. S., why should one oppose such a trend?

    Lack of orientation by those formed in such a system is the answer to this rhetorical question, since education is not a good like all the others.  Unlike commercial commodities, such as grain, it is the one grain that stands out of the mass that yields the hidden value: qualitative measurements, and systems of mass production of knowledge at lower cost, will miss the chance to find this grain.  In a way, the commercial streamlining of the output-oriented modern university in all its forms threatens our intellectual freedom more than direct censorship of freedom of speech would have threatened a democracy: such a commercial entity leaves no space for the elaboration of new answers, and it will not be possible to find a forum for the discussion of such answers.

    We also have to consider classical warning voices against all trends of focused output measured study: if an educational system fails, Plato’s Republic (VIII) shows how tyrannis can develop out of a democracy that has failed to educate its elites and population.  Karl Jasper saw some of the same signs Natale calls “The corporate eclipse of the university”:  “Durch die Ausbildung der Arbeitskräfte für die Zwecke der in ganz ziellose, immer nur an partikulare Zwecke gebundenen technischen Massengeschäft wird der Aufgabe der Universität nicht genug getan” (Jaspers).  (“The education of workers for particular purposes to satisfy specific needs of technological mass production does not fulfil the original task of the university.”)

    The limitation of the scope of the university to such short-term goals, which today’s corporatization demands, eliminates the search for non-tangible long-term goals.  “Mit der Universität sinken Gesellschaft und Staat ab“ (Jaspers, Hoffacker). (“Society and state fall with the university.”)

    Society and the university are linked: without universal scope of its mission, the institution is reduced to a corporate entity like all the others.  However, corporate goals are short term, quantitative goals, which are measured by financial outcome.  The goals of a university can be reduced to such corporate goals with streamlined, more efficient corporate structures.  However, the university will then have to loose one essential part of its mission for society: to provide meaning, to search for meaning, and to define the guidelines for society.  The essence of its mission is not the teaching of survival skills alone.  Only in the framework of a free academic institution can we expect to gain orientation in more than the literal sense.  The teaching of skills alone outdates quickly.  It does not live up to the expectations of the new clients, industry (interested in a skilled workforce) and students (interested in stable, well numerated employment).  The sense and meaning giving capacity of a free, independent, not financially restrained university is a condition for the further development of society: it is not astonishing to see that the German university through its students was the father of the first democratic movements in Germany.  Students in such institutions of higher learning led the change of society, and they resisted attempts of corporatisation successfully in the France of the sixties through the nineties of the last century.  Devaquet could not implement modest reforms of the curriculum.  Such intellectual and political independence which forced structural change will be impossible in a commercialised university system when the students are reduced to the role of paying clients or potential donors, and the faculty are following the work  for hire concept of employment.  Without an idealistic core of studies, that allows to search for orientation in world which is less and less easy to decipher, the individual, be it student or professor, will lack the necessary educational background to orient her/himself.  Without such non-focused liberal arts training, the necessary intellectual maturity to confront future problems, to continue education, is not provided.

    To find a way out of this dead end scenario, universities have to play a dominant role:  Orientation is only possible if the universities can provide more than a belief that “anything goes.” Natale calls this current activity “bobbing aimlessly in a sea of cultural relativism in which it seems that anything can count as knowledge” (Natale: 29).   A “one fits all” educational answer cannot be found.  The challenge to be addressed after elitist education is mass education.  Corporatisation as the current trend can offer commercialised, partially good results.  It  is natural that large organizations offer their own, corporate forms of carrier management.  Only when this form of qualification starts to threaten and replace the non-for-profit forms of education is society as such in danger (Luhmann).

    To help future generations of students to “orient themselves” in a more and more diverse reality, certain ground rules for general education have to be reintroduced in all forms of higher learning: a core, not in the sense of a strictly defined body of knowledge, but in the sense of a skill transcending form of classical, root oriented “Bildung.”  Such a form of education in the own tradition has to be complemented by the study of other traditions, in other languages, which will allow an objective view of the own background, and a conversation beyond the own background.  In the latter respect, the Continental universities are able to show a growing proficiency in foreign languages, and are well ahead of their U. S. counterparts.  However, as far as “study abroad” are  concerned, private institutions of higher learning such as the Fontainebleau-based INSEAT are leading the phalanx, followed by universities of applied sciences which offer instruction in English.  However, one of the oldest and most venerated institutions of higher learning in Belgium, the University of Löwen/Leuven has successfully introduced an international track in its curriculum, offering the view of a foreign yet related culture (in English language) to students from abroad, with a large constituency from the U. S.

    Further, such a “public interest”curriculum would have to make space a moral education of students: a modern society without communally shared and reflected values cannot expect its members to bear responsibility beyond their own immediate interests.

    “Aufklärung in einzelnen Subjekten durch Erziehung zu gründen, ist also garleicht, man muß nur früh anfangen, die jungen Köpfe an diese Reflexion zu gewöhnen“ (Kant WDO: 146).“To found enlightenment in single subjects by education is therefore very easy; one has nothing to do but do begin early to accustom young understanding to this reflection”  (Richardson: 407).

    As a response to the “customized approach to education,” (Natale: 42) that is offered by corporate for profit educational models, the financial balance has to be tilted in the direction of non-for profit institutions, be they state sponsored or private (Such as the Jesuit insitutions of higher learning in Germany which are only co-financed up to 18 percent [Hochschule für Philosophie München] by public sources).  For the sake of sound finances, in view of the need for widespread affordable access to education in the 21st century, the tuition question has to be addressed: it is fundamentally unfair to allow all students to study without contribution to the cost of studies.  The current no or low tuition model supports the strongest in studies and research, without the necessary redistribution of resources to support the weaker parts of the system.  The old tutorial system of the British flagship institutions is equally unaffordable and unfair, since it limits the best instruction to a small minority.  Even land grants cannot support mass education, and continental universities lack endowments of any form.

    However, the “good deal” offered to society by students from public institutions has its price.  Supplementing the tuition to be raised from those who can afford it, the state will have to finance the difference to the cost of private education, thus offering the incentives for the non-job related training in values, meaning and orientation.  The classical liberal arts education in public institutions has to be revived with the help of public funding, yielding a long-term benefit to society as a whole.  For this purpose, it will also be necessary to further include all teaching faculty in the general mission of the university, thus offering a valid alternative to corporate, for profit models of education.  This faculty-involvement in the changes of society made the German universities of the 19th century to the engine of societal change.  Through the ‘Göttingen Five’, it also provided a forum for democratic reform or resistance to tyranny.

    Such an alternative to vocational training cannot be solely based on the radical liberal arts concept as presented by Bishop Newman and others (Natale: 88).  “Vocational” training cannot be entirely dismissed from a modern university: the mediated form of knowledge which removes us further and further from the culture of scripture alone demands more training in vocational skills than offered by classical grammar or high schools.  The use of body extending devices such as computers is necessary, and requires further training than penmanship.  Those Germanic universities that have not been willing to accept this necessity of modern academia will remain the losers of the international competition for the best educational system.  Less and less foreign students are enrolled in German universities.  However, the strategic alliances forged to keep up with technological change are a dangerous first step in the direction of corporatization of a genuinely not-for-profit field.  Again, a balance is needed, with state funding for value education, fundamental research and liberal arts education, supplemented with focused financing of specific projects (“Drittmittelforschung”) and tuition.

    Specialization and relevance of studies play a legitimate role in the choice of future careers (Natale: 96 f).  However, a general curriculum that includes cultural literacy does not contradict vocational requirements of future employers.  It is one of the major flaws of the European university system that it prepares its students badly for life after academia, and that the students graduate at an advanced age which makes it difficult to include them in corporate structures.  The competition with the more flexible universities of applied sciences will allow to sharpen both profiles.  However, a general re-orientation, away from the current, financially tempting trend of corporatisation is needed.

    To act, all agents have to have a minimum of knowledge of their actions.  Without any contact with “real” life beyond academia, such orientation will be impossible.  Orientation is always orientation about orientation.  Orientation is determined by previous orientation, which means that, in the sense of Kant’s work cited above, we can only orient ourself if we are able to determine our horizon.  For this successful application of knowledge, it is necessary to master the media: what we need is further media literacy.  Lack of orientation, as deplored widely in society, cannot be overcome by vocational training alone.  Liberal arts training that allows such orientation complements application of knowledge: it is its precondition, if the skills have to be updated at a later point in life.  Lifelong learning is only successful if the foundations are solid: quantitative and qualitative knowledge has to be conveyed in a value-building environment.  These goals of society transcend corporate needs and corporate mission.

    They form the context, in which a healthy corporate environment can grow.  Without direction, skills cannot be applied.  The finding and defining of meaning oscillates between the satisfaction of needs (applied science, vocational training) and the desire to find meaning (Orth: 21 ff.).  Even the sensualist Abbé de Condillac is aware that there is more to experience than senses alone: Economy is seen as the science of needs.  Such needs can only be determined with a view beyond the scope of the immediate application.  Philosophy, in the sense of the old “philosophicum,” can reconciliate theoria and praxis.  It has to help to orient the orientation, to find direction, to define standpoints, and to develop alternatives.

    “Es wird aber dieser Ausdruck auf das Gebiet der Erkenntniß übertragen, und da heißt sich orientieren soviel als sich auf jenem Gebiete zurecht finden, und zwar dadurch, daß man die Gesetze der Erkenntniß aufsucht.  Da nun dieß bloß durch Philosophieren möglich ist, so ist die Philosophie gleichsam die Orientierungs-Wissenschaft in Bezug auf alle übrige Wissenschaften.  Soll sie aber dieß sein, so muß sie freilich vorher ihren eigenen Orient oder Aufgangspunct gefunden haben.  Ob sie diesen bereits gefunden, ist zur Zeit noch problematisch (Krug: 131; “Transferred to the field of knowledge, orientation means finding one’s way of seeking the laws of knowledge.  Since this is only possible through philosophising, philosophy alone can help to guide us as the orientational science of the sciences. If philosophy endeavours to be just that it first has to find its own horizon, or starting point. Whether it has found it is difficult to say at this time.”).

    It is indeed questionable if philosophy has found its own standpoint.   However, it can depict alternative ways of seeing, without judging.  That these alternatives can be evaluated as corporate planning makes them applicable, yet they are not part of corporate planning.  They are the condition of the development of future applications.

    To orient oneself means to find one’s place, but also to be able, figuratively, to know.  Curriculae that help orientate allow preparing the necessary choices in a society where compromise has informed consent as a precondition.  It further means that we are orientating ourselves in different dimensions, in different cultural fields.  We can define goals only if we are able to bridge the gap between theory and praxis.  Disorientation, a lack of knowledge or a lack of acceptance of common sense, can be mediated via liberal arts education (Lübbe, Orth: 30).  The danger of purely applied education and purely vocational training is that it provides the illusion of orientation, whereas it only offers an unreflected standpoint.  Training does not prepare for change.  In the platonic sense, it is not an art.  Since change occurs faster than ever, higher education has to offer the necessary resting place for fundamental reflection that prepares for faster adaptation in the future.  Time is of the essence and the reflective capacity, the look back in order to find the way, is in danger. Kant: "To orientate oneself, in the proper sense of the word, means to use a given direction -- and we divide the horizon into four of these -- in order to find the others, and in particular that of sunrise." (Reiss 238, AA VIII 134)  Orientation needs knowledge here and now, but also a sense of direction.

    Kant is aware of this problem:  “Ein Zeitalter aber aufzuklären, ist sehr langwierig.”  (Reiss: 249 "To enlighten an era, however, is a very protracted process;" Richardson: 407 “But to enlighten an age, is very wearisome”).

    The solution for education has to be a structure that allows both the applied and the traditional university structure to provide the necessary space and time to find the way.  In a purely corporate educational environment, this will not be achievable.  In a short-term election based state run system, this will equally be impossible.  As Steffens found, the state and science have fundamentally different interests.  So do corporate entities.  Only society has the right and duty to define its goals by balancing the present and future interests of all.  A balance between all the parts is needed to define the new, old, re-oriented university.  Re-orientation means that not all can do everything at the same time: redefinition of mission and specific “niche” service to society that allows positioning all the players (Natale: 208).  If society defines itself as a marketplace, it has also to present itself in terms of the marketplace.  A re-oriented university will have no problem presenting its long-term achievements and will demonstrate potential for such achievements.  Yet we cannot assess them with the same short-term quantitative tools we use in economics.  Some symbols transcend their prize.  A flag has little or no commercial value, and yet it is symbol for all values of a society or group.  Universities are flagships of value finding and symbols of orientation in a disoriented time.  They are society’s only tools to master the mediated, media-driven information age. The defence of the salient place of the university as universitas magistrorum et scholarium was possible through independence from state and church from the 13th centuryToday it needs to guard its independence from commercial and immediate needs to remain the orienting institution of societyThe university needs its autonomy to achieve its goal with knowledge: “denn über Gelehrte als solche können nur Gelehrte urtheilen" (“since only genuine scholars can judge about scholars.” A VII, 17, The Contest of the Faculties (CF), introduction, not translated).  Finally, orientation has to be disinterested, neutral and knowledgeable, as Kant claimed: “Rational inquiry and moral conduct can be practised properly only in a society governed according to principles of politics based on the idea of freedom." (Reiss: 236)

 

Bibliography

 

Unless stated otherwise, translations from German are my own, in bracketsPage references to Kant's works in the text and in endnotes refer to the relevant volumes of the Prussian Academy edition (Kant's gesammelte Schriften. 27 volumes. Edited by the Königlichen Preußischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin, Reimer (later de Gruyter), 1900-, quoted as AA and according to the abbreviation key of the Kantbibliographie). 
 

Elizabeth-Maria Bauer, Die Hochschule als Wirtschaftsfaktor, Münchner Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeographie, vol. 41, Lassleben Kallmütz, Regensburg 1997, pp. 20-21.

Wilhelm Bleek, Von der Kameralausbildung zum Juristenprivileg, Berlin 1972.
Michael Bösch, „Symbolische Prägnanz und Passive Synthesis“, Philosophisches Jahrbuch # 109, I, 2002, pp. 148-161.
Edelgard Bulmahn (ed.), Antworten auf Fragen zur Juniorprofessur, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Berlin 2002.

Daniel Fallon, The German University, A Heroic Ideal in Conflict with the Modern World, Colorado Associated Press, Boulder 1980, p. 6.

Peter Glotz, Im Kern Verrotted, Fünf vor Zwölf and Deutschlands Universität, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1996.

Jürgen Habermas, Protestbewegung und Hochschulreform, Suhrkamp, Ffm 1969, p. 121.

N. Hammerstein, Universität, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Ritter ed al., vol. XI, Schwab, Basel 2001, p. 215.

Werner Hoffacker, Die Universität im 21. Jahrhundert, Dienstleistungsunternehmen, öffentliche Einrichtung, Luchterhand, Neuwied 2000.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, 17 Vols, Berlin 1903-36, vol. X, p. 257.

--Unmaßgebliche Gedanken zur Einrichtung des Litauischen Schulwesens, 1809, Akadademie Ausgabe, vol. XIII, 1920, p. 279.

William James, “The PhD Octopus”, Harvard Monthly, vol. 36, 1903, pp. 1-3.

Karl Jaspers, „Das Doppelgesicht der Universitätsreform“, in Deutsche Universitätszeitung 1960, # 3, vol. 15, p. 8.

Josef Joffe, „Das Gestern als Gesetz“, Linkes Projekt, (unge)rechte Folgen, in Die Zeit, 18, 25. April 2002, p. 1.

Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften:
--Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (1784) AA VIII(=WA)
--An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment? (=Enlightenment), in Kant's Political Writings, transl. H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss (=Reiss), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, 2nd ed. 1990.
--Der Streit der Fakultäten, AA VII (=SdF)
--Verkündigung des nahen Abschlusses eines Tractats zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie (1796) In: AA VIII 421 f.
--Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientiren? (1786, modern spelling: orientieren). AA VIII, 131-47 (=WDO). First published in Berlinische Monatsschrift, VIII (October 1786), 304-30.
--What is Orientation in Thinking? In (Reiss)
The first translation by William Richardson (London, Royal Exchange, 1798) calls the text: “What means, to orient one’s self in thinking” (=Richardson)
--Zum ewigen Frieden (1795), AA VIII
Clark Kerr, Postscipt 1982, The Uses of the University, 3rd edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1982, p. 152 f.
Achim D. Köddermann, ”Why the Medieval Idea of the University is still modern“, Educational Change, 1995, I, pp. 78 f. and 96.
Wilhelm Traugott Krug, Allgemeines Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Wissenschaften nebst ihrer Literatur und Geschichte, vol. 3, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1833, p. 131. (=Krug)

Hermann Lübbe (ed), Der Mensch als Orientierungsweise, Alber, Freiburg/München 1982.

Niklas Luhmann, Das Erziehungssystem der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Ffm 2002, p. 70 f.
Helmut Mathy, Die Universität Mainz, 1477-1977, Krach, Mainz 1977.

Moses Mendelsohn, Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes, Berlin 1785, Jubiläumsausgabe vol. 2/3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1974, p. 82.

Wilfried Mische, Agathe Odinius, Die Fachhochschule in Deutschland, FH Aachen, FB Wirtschaft, Siebengebirgsverlag Wienands, Bad Honnef 1998, pp. 16-17.

Samuel M. Natale, Anthony F. Libertella, Geoff Hayward, Higher Education in Crisis, The Corporate Eclipse of the University, Global Publications, Binghamton 2001. (=Natale)

Ralf Neuhaus, Dokumente zur Hochschulreform, 1961, p. 264: “Blaues Gutachten”, 1948: the universities carry on an in its core healthy tradition: “Hochschulen als Träger einer alten und im Kern gesunden Tradition.“ Justification is that they educate more than specialists: „nicht nur als Spezialist, sondern auch als Mensch tauglich.“ (=Neuhaus)

Ernst Wolfgang Orth, Was ist und was heißt „Kultur“?, Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2000, pp. 32 f.

Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress Microfilm, series T, Doc. 18172, reel 22, quoted in Robert R. Riegel, Young America, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1949. (=Jefferson)

Bernd Rüthers, Universität und Gesellschaft, Thesen zu einer Entfremdung, Universitätsverlag Konstanz, Konstanz 1980, p. 16.

Ralf Seelbach, Staat, Universität und Kirche, Die Instititutionen- und Systemtheorie Immanuel Kants, Peter Lang, Ffm 1993.
Eduard Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Reform des Bildungswesens, 1919, 2nd edition Tübingen 1965, pp. 200-204.
C. R. Weld, A History of the Royal Society, vol. I, J. W. Parker, London 1848, p. 146.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae
 
Achim D. Koeddermann studied philosophy, the Laws and Comparative Literature at Dijon (universite de Bourgogne), Heidelberg University and Mainz University before receiving his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz, in 1990.  He also worked as corporate planner for German Public Television (ZDF), and held visiting appointments at Denver University and Sripatum University, Bangkok.  He is associate professor of philosophy at the State University of New York, College at Oneonta, and associate member or CEMERS (Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies) at Binghamton University.  The focus of his research lies in applied philosophy (Media-, Business- and Environmental Ethics) and philosophy of culture (History of Ideas, Hermeneutics, Aesthetics).